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Summary 
The present study aimed to explore autobiographical memories (long-lasting 
memories about the self) and episodic memories (memories about discrete episodes 
or events) within dream content. We adapted earlier episodic memory study 
paradigms and re-investigated the incorporation of episodic memory sources into 
dreams, operationalising episodic memory as featuring autonoetic consciousness, 
which is the feeling of truly re-experiencing or reliving a past event. Participants 
(N=32) recorded daily diaries, dream diaries, and reported on wake-dream relations 
for two weeks. Dreams were rated for their episodic richness, using a new scale, 
which categorised memory sources of dreams as being truly episodic (featuring 
autonoetic consciousness), autobiographical (containing segregated features of 
experiences that pertained to waking life), or otherwise. Only one dream (0.5%) was 
found to contain an episodic memory. However, the majority of dreams (>80%) were 
found to contain low to moderate incorporations of autobiographical memory 
features. These findings demonstrate the inactivity of intact episodic memories, and 
emphasise the activity of autobiographical memory and processing within dreams.  
Taken together this suggests that memories for personal experiences are 
fragmentarily and selectively experienced during dreaming, in order to assimilate 
these memories into the autobiographical memory schema. 
 Keywords: dreaming; sleep mentation; memory structure; memory incorporation; continuity 
hypothesis; declarative memory 
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Introduction  
The Continuity Hypothesis of dreaming (e.g. Hall & Nordby, 1972), in its most basic 
form, recognises the overlap between waking life and dreaming. It has been studied 
in numerous ways, such as via the investigation of the memory sources of dreams 
(e.g. Baylor & Cavallero, 2001). The continuity of waking-life memories in dreams 
has implications for the memory consolidation function of sleep, i.e. the notion that 
waking-life memories are selectively enhanced during sleep (e.g. Stickgold & Walker, 
2005). Studies have shown that sleep facilitates memory consolidation: for example, 
rapid-eye-movement (REM) sleep benefits emotional memory (Payne, 2010), and 
non-REM (NREM) sleep benefits episodic memory (memories for discrete 
experiences and events; Walker & Stickgold, 2006). Some research indicates that 
dream content reflects these processes, such as the emotionality of REM dreams 
(Hobson et al., 2000), and the greater number of episodic memory sources of 
dreams in NREM sleep (Baylor & Cavallero, 2001). We pursue this line of enquiry in 
the present paper. 
However, in the case of episodic memories (EMs), memories for experiences with 
specific time and place referents (Tulving, 1983; 2002) being consolidated during 
sleep, there is heterogeneity in the results, and the tasks designed to measure 
episodic memory lack ecological validity as they often utilise tasks such as 
memorising word lists, which are not valid EMs as they are not memories for discrete 
events but rather memories for information (Rauchs et al., 2005). Dream research is 
similarly inconclusive in that there are conflicting accounts of the amount of EM 
replay in dreams. One study found that EMs were very rare (<2%) in dreams (Fosse 
et al., 2003), while another has found that ‘discrete episode’ memory sources 
accounted for up to 38% of dream content (Cavallero et al., 1990). If EMs are rarely 
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dreamt of, yet sleep improves EM consolidation, then this process must take place 
via a method that does not involve replaying intact EMs.  
The differences between the dream results may have arisen from incompatible uses 
of the term ‘episodic memory’. The present study aimed first to review studies that 
have measured waking-life EMs, then to apply a suitable definition to the 
interpretation of the memory sources of dreams, leading to a new study that has 
been designed to measure EM as conceptualised by current theory.  
The study that most explicitly deals with EMs in dreams is Fosse et al.’s (2003), in 
which participants wrote down their dreams and waking-life activities for a fortnight. 
Of the 299 dream reports, only 1.7% were deemed to contain EMs. For a dream to 
be rated as containing an EM, there had to be high confidence that the dream was a 
representation of the waking-life event, and high similarity between the dream and 
waking experience. Additionally, the locations had to be strongly similar, and at least 
two of the other features (e.g. characters) had to be matched, as well as 
conservation of all actions, characters, and objects. There also had to be a detailed 
description of the waking event. Although the study found a low rate of complete EMs 
it found that 65% of the dreams contained at least two episodic features of waking 
life, such as characters or locations. 
Fosse et al. (2003) noted the difference between their finding and that of an earlier 
study which also looked at EM in dreams (Dement et al., 1965), which found that 
12% of dreams contained ‘complete’ renditions of the laboratory setting. Dement et 
al.’s definition of ‘complete’ was much broader in scope than Fosse et al.’s of an EM: 
the criteria were: the appearance of the experimental situation; its purpose; and the 
dreamer themselves in the bed with electrodes attached. Characters were usually 
 6 
 
retained, but the number was allowed to vary, and there could even be other 
characters, illustrating the variability in the use and definition of EM. 
Further, Cavallero et al. (1990), when investigating memory sources of dreams, 
defined EMs even more broadly: ‘discrete episodes’, opposing semantic and abstract 
memories, were defined as a “discrete episode in the life of the dreamer, with precise 
spatial and/or temporal coordinates” (p.452). This is clearly broader than both of the 
other studies’ definitions and this broadness is reflected in the results: discrete 
episodes accounted for 32-38% of early- and late-night non-rapid-eye-movement 
(NREM) sleep dream sources and approximately 28% of early- and late-night rapid-
eye movement (REM) sleep dream sources.  
EM is memory for discrete episodes or events (e.g. Tulving, 1983; 1991), and is often 
conceptualised in opposition to semantic memory, which is a more generalised type 
of memory for our knowledge of the world (e.g. Baddeley, 2001; Tulving, 1983). 
Current conceptualisations of EM, which break from earlier theories, suggest that 
EMs are detailed summary accounts of short time-period experiences which are 
forgotten within 24 hours unless they are consolidated during sleep and subsequently 
become linked to autobiographical memories (AMs) (Conway, 2001, 2009; Williams 
et al., 2008). EMs, therefore, can be intricately tied to AMs, but the two have different 
features. 
AMs, in contrast, are memory constructions, holding information about the self, 
created from episodic (events or experiences) and semantic (knowledge) memories. 
While EMs may help to achieve short term goals and therefore do not endure for long 
time periods (such as ‘getting to work’), AMs link with longer-term goals (such as 
‘getting a job’), and are also essential for a sense of self (Conway, 2001; Conway & 
Pleydell-Pearce, 2000). We need to draw upon both personal experiences and 
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information in order to create a sense of identity. Simultaneously, this cognitive ‘self’ 
acts as a reference point for the ways in which personal experiences are made sense 
of and subsequently recalled. This can lead to misremembering, so that an EM might 
be altered if it conflicts with an already-established personal memory or goal. Thus, 
EM incorporates aspects of autobiographical remembering, including the ‘working 
self-concept’ (Conway & Pleydell-Pearce, 2000). AMs, therefore, are long-lasting 
memories about the self, which may be informed by any of the memory systems, 
such as episodic or semantic. The activity of these discrete types of memory within 
sleep has not been investigated formally in previous studies. We wish to clarify the 
distinction between EMs and AMs, and investigate the incorporation of both within 
dreams.  
A particularly important feature of EM that distinguishes it from AM is ‘autonoetic 
consciousness’, which involves the true re-experiencing or reliving of the memory of 
a past event, particularly a personal experience, as well as the awareness that the 
event happened in one’s personal history, rather than the present (Baddeley, 2001; 
Gardiner, 2001; Levine et al., 2002; Tulving, 2002). Only EMs are characterised by 
this feature.  The distinction between EM and AM with regard to autonoetic 
consciousness is well illustrated by the case of the patient know as KC, who retained 
some parts of his AM (such as knowledge of various aspects of his childhood), but 
who could not recall any memories that required autonoetic consciousness, i.e. his 
personal past experiences (Tulving, 2002). EMs, therefore, are fleeting memories of 
experiences, with autonoetic consciousness, which may endure if they are 
consolidated into the autobiographical memory schema.  
Of the empirical studies, only Fosse et al. (2003) attempted to define EM in detail. 
However, none of the studies’ criteria for EMs, including Fosse et al.’s, conformed to 
the current conceptualisations of EM: i.e., they did not include a requirement for the 
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dream to elicit a sense of autonoetic consciousness. In addition, Fosse et al.’s 
criterion for conserving all actions, characters, and objects may be unnecessary 
since episodic memories are thought to be summary accounts, but the broadness of 
the Cavallero et al.’s (1990) study is also inappropriate, since the definition ‘a 
discreet episode’ does not generate a sense of reliving the experience. In addition, 
Fosse et al.’s criterion of confidence in the dream memory association may be an 
invalid stipulation, since one can have confidence in a false memory (e.g. Roediger & 
McDermott, 1995), and since remembering and knowing (autonoetic and noetic 
consciousness) do not necessarily correspond with levels of confidence (Gardiner, 
2001). It is the autonoetic nature of the dream, rather than the confidence that the 
dream was caused by an episodic memory, that needs to be emphasised.  
The present study utilised the same dream-diary procedure as Fosse et al. (2003) 
but with a different method of rating the dreams for EMs. The method developed 
intended to separate out EMs (with autonoetic consciousness) from AMs, using a 
modified version of the episodic-autobiographical rating scale developed in the 
Autobiographical Memory Interview (Kopelman et al., 1989; Levine et al., 2002), 
which measures the episodic richness of AMs. The highest point on the original 
rating scale (the only point that includes autonoetic consciousness) was the only one 
that was considered to describe an EM in the present study. Whilst all dream 
memory sources were autobiographical insofar as they related to the dreamer’s own 
waking life, other points on the scale, which measured lower degrees of episodic 
richness, may be more related to the AM system. That is, as the scale points 
decrease, so too do the clarity and specificity – or episodic nature – of the memories 
being described, whilst the constructive – or autobiographical nature – increase.  
The aims of the study were to investigate the frequency of EMs in dreams using the 
above method, and to ascertain whether AMs that are richly episodic but fall short of 
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autonoetic consciousness would be more ubiquitous in dreams than EMs. It was 
hypothesised that there would be a disproportionate distribution of the memory 
sources of dreams, with there being very few dream reports containing pure EMs, but 
many more containing AM features.  
 
Method 
Participants 
Participants were recruited via a participation credit scheme at Leeds Metropolitan 
University, in which undergraduate psychology students participate for course 
credits, and via opportunity sample. 32 participants (26 female, 6 male; 16 Leeds 
Metropolitan University undergraduates, 16 colleagues, friends, and acquaintances 
of the experimenters) were recruited, with an age range of 19 to 55 years of age (M = 
26.44, SD = 9.40). 328 dreams in total were collected with a mean of 9.91 dreams 
per participant (SD = 4.87). Of these, 186 were suitable for analysis, having both a 
dream and a description of its waking relation. It was decided to exclude dreams with 
no discussion of wake-dream relation because for some dreams, there were one or 
two waking-life elements reported (such as a character or a location), but no waking-
life experience detailed in the report, meaning that it was not possible to compare the 
dream against an actual event. 
Design 
The dream-diary paradigm was employed over fourteen consecutive days. 
Participants were requested to record as many of their dreams as possible, in as 
 10 
 
much detail as possible but without post-hoc elaboration, upon awakening from sleep 
at any part of the night or in the morning, or at any time during the following day. 
Daily reports were recorded prospectively each day rather than retrospectively at the 
end of the study. This closely followed the method employed by Fosse et al. (2003). 
Though reliant on spontaneous recall in the morning following sleep, home-based 
studies have been shown to differ little, in terms of the content of dreams, to 
systematic-awakening (laboratory-based) studies (Domhoff & Schneider, 1999).  
The waking-life diary involved reporting up to five Major Daily Activities, Personally 
Significant Events and Major Concerns (each after Fosse et al., 2003), plus Novel 
Experiences from that day. Analyses on the different waking-life experiences are 
reported in Malinowski and Horton (under review).  Participants also provided a 
report on how the dream related to their waking-life experiences. Instructions were 
given on how to report waking-life activities and wake-dream relations, including 
rating dream elements for wake-dream similarity on a scale of 1 (no similarity) to 5 
(identical). Fosse et al.’s criterion of the conservation of all actions, locations and 
characters was not included, as discussed. Finally, participants were interviewed at 
the end of the fourteen days of the study to allow further investigation of dream-wake 
relations. The interview schedule contained starter questions such as: “Can you tell 
me more about [dream and corresponding waking event]?”. 
An Episodic Richness in Dreams scale (Table 1) was developed to assess the extent 
to which EMs and AMs were present in participants’ dreams, adapted from the 
episodic richness scale of the Autobiographical Memory Interview (AMI), and also 
using Fosse et al.’s (2003) similarity criterion. Ratings were based on participants’ 
dream, waking-life activity, and wake-dream relation reports, and interview material 
(which augmented brief or missing information from the reports), and frequencies 
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were calculated for each of the points on the scale. No further analyses were 
conducted on the interview data. 
[Insert Table 1 here] 
0 points denoted a dream that contained no information from an episode from the 
dreamer’s life. 1-3 points denoted a dream containing non-episodically rich (1), 
moderately episodically rich (2), or highly episodically rich (3) memories. 4 points 
denoted a true EM with autonoetic consciousness. Points 3 and 4 were identical 
other than the added criterion of autonoetic consciousness for point 4. Points 1-3 
referred to AM incorporations: they were episodes from the dreamer’s personal 
history, but not true EMs because they did not contain autonoetic consciousness.   
Materials 
Participants were given a booklet in which to record their dreams and daily activities 
for fourteen consecutive days. The front page contained the instructions on how to 
record dreams, daily activities, and wake-dream relations. The remainder of the 
booklet comprised one Daily Activity Log and three Dream Logs for each day of the 
study (fourteen days in total, a total of fourteen Daily Activity and 42 Dream Logs).  
Each Dream Log contained one A4 page for participants to describe the dream and 
rate it for emotional and stressfulness intensities on a scale of 0 (not at all intense) to 
9 (very intense) (for which analyses are reported in Malinowski and Horton (under 
review)). On the back of this page there was space for participants to identify up to 
20 elements (characters, objects, actions, locations, emotions and themes) of the 
dream that related to a waking event or thought, and record the degree of similarity 
between the dream and the waking experience on a scale of 1 to 5. Finally, space 
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was provided for participants to describe the waking event(s) or thought(s) that they 
believed the dream was related to. 
A Pulse Smartpen and dot paper (a pen with built-in Dictaphone that records speech 
and writes at the same time) was used to audio-record interviews with participants.  
Procedure 
Participants met with one of the experimenters, and were instructed on the 
requirements of the study. Once any questions they had were sufficiently answered, 
participants were given an information sheet to read and an informed consent form to 
sign, which detailed that the voluntariness of their participation, their anonymity, and 
their right to withdraw from the study at any time without reason or negative 
consequence. Following this, participants were given the booklet and required to 
follow the instructions within and return it after they had completed the fourteen 
consecutive days of the study. Once participants had returned their booklets, they 
had a 20 minute interview with one of the experimenters focusing on dreams that 
were accompanied by a related waking-life experience report.  
The study abided by British Psychological Society ethical guidelines, and received 
local approval from the university’s ethics review panel.  
Analyses focused on rating dreams on the Episodic Richness in Dreams Scale. Initial 
analyses were conducted by the first author. To test for inter-rate reliability, a subset 
of the dreams (20%) was scored by a second judge; rate of exact agreement was 
calculated to be 82.5%, and the remaining disagreements were discussed and 
resolved.  
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Results 
A total of 328 dreams were submitted, ranging from 8 to 404 words in length (M = 
82.43, SD = 58.81), of which 186 were suitable for analysis (having both a dream 
and an accompanying waking-life experience report – all dreams meeting this 
criterion were included, irrespective of report length), again ranging from 8 to 404 
words (M = 86.42, SD = 61.39). They were rated for episodic richness on the scale of 
0 to 4 and frequency counts of each scale level (i.e. points 0, 1, 2, 3, and 4 on the 
scale) were calculated to obtain a percentage for each scale level.  
The mean score for Episodic Richness in Dreams was 1.56 (SD = .78), indicating 
that dreams mostly contained low to moderate levels of similarity with a waking-life 
experience. Table 2 shows the distribution percentages for each point on the 
Episodic Richness in Dreams scale, and Table 3 gives an example of the scoring for 
each kind of dream-wake relationship. 
[Insert Table 2 here] 
As can be seen, EMs with autonoetic consciousness were very rare (0.5%), and the 
frequency increased as episodic richness decreased, from high episodic richness 
(11.83%), to moderate episodic richness (35.48%), to low episodic richness 
(47.31%). Dreams containing no wake-dream relations were also quite rare (4.84%). 
Furthermore, 142 of the total 328 dreams did not include any wake-dream relation 
reports.  
[Insert Table 3 here] 
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Discussion 
As predicted, EMs, defined as featuring autonoetic consciousness (Baddeley, 2001; 
Gardiner, 2001; Levine et al., 2002; Tulving, 2002), were found to be very rare in 
dreams (0.5%). This 0.5% represents just one out of 186 dreams. The waking 
experience to which the dream relates occurred on the evening of the fifth day of the 
experiment, with the dream coming on the sixth, just over twenty-four hours later, in 
keeping with the idea that episodic memories are of short duration (Conway, 2001, 
2009; Williams et al., 2008).  
Highly similar AMs from waking life, which are episodically rich but lack autonoetic 
consciousness, occurred with much greater frequency, making up over a tenth of all 
dreams reported (11.83%). This figure is comparable to Dement et al.’s (1965) 12% 
of dreams containing complete incorporation of the experimental situation. As 
discussed by Fosse et al. (2003), the difference between their findings and Dement 
et al.’s probably occurred due to increasingly liberal criteria in the latter, such as 
permitting character substitution. The criteria used in the present study for highly 
episodically-rich AMs is similarly liberal, stipulating that dreams must be ‘highly 
similar’ to the original experience, but allowing them to include such things as 
different locations or character substitution. This falls in line with current conceptions 
of AM (Conway, 2001, 2009; Conway & Pleydell-Pearce, 2000; Williams et al., 2008). 
Dreams with moderate similarity to waking-life experiences were common (35.48%). 
This figure is comparable to that found by Cavallero et al. (1990), who found that 
between 28% and 38% of dreams across the night contained EMs. Again, the 
increase in the proportion of EMs in dreams in Cavallero et al.’s study and in dreams 
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scoring 2 points on the Episodic Richness in Dreams scale in the present study can 
be explained by the continuing increasingly liberal criteria in defining EMs, since 2 
points in the present study denoted moderate similarity to an EM from waking life, 
and Cavallero et al.’s relatively broad definition of ‘episodic’ similarly allowed for only 
moderate relations to waking life to constitute EMs. 
Most common were dreams that had low levels of similarity to waking-life 
experiences (47.31%). This falls in line with the many studies that found high 
incidences of episodic features from waking life (as reviewed by Fosse et al., 2003). 
The way EM and AM are operationalised influences the interpretation of the memory 
sources of dreams. We propose that relationships between AMs from waking life and 
dreams are a more appropriate conceptualisation of the memory sources of dreams 
than EMs in dreams. 
Although the present study differs in its conceptualisation of EM, using a theory-
driven definition, it mirrors the findings of Fosse et al. (2003). In fact, the present 
study found EMs to be even rarer. These findings indicate that true EM is indeed 
extremely rare in dreams, utilising the dream-diary paradigm. Since the question 
concerning the definition of EM has now been addressed, the question of why intact 
EMs were found to be so rare in dreams must be considered.  
It has been suggested that memory sources of dreams, as an operationalisaton of 
the Continuity Hypothesis, reflect the activation of memories during the processes of 
sleep-dependent consolidation. However, following this line of argument, the present 
findings may seem at odds with evidence of EMs being consolidated in sleep 
(Rauchs et al., 2004). We propose that the partial activation during sleep of 
information from waking life still fulfils a function of consolidation.  
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Some memory researchers (Conway, 2001, 2009; Williams et al., 2008) have 
suggested that EMs may be replayed fragmentarily way because only that which is 
novel or salient need be consolidated and incorporated into longer-term memory 
schema such as the AM system. This view has been endorsed also by sleep and 
dream researchers, such as Schwartz (2003), who suggests that the 65% of EM 
elements found by Fosse et al. (2003) may be present fragmentarily due to their 
novelty or salience. Similarly, Payne and Nadel (2004) regard dreams as a reflection 
of the biological process of consolidating new memories and integrating them into 
older ones, while Stickgold et al. (2001) suggest that the unique activation of the 
REM brain is geared up “to identify and evaluate novel cortical associations in the 
light of emotions” (p.1056). The emphasis, then, is on the novelty and/or the salience 
of the waking-life memories. Further, waking-life experiences may be selectively 
consolidated depending on their levels of emotionality. Payne et al. (2008) have 
demonstrated that emotional waking-life memories are selectively consolidated over 
neutral ones, and two studies have demonstrated that emotional waking-life 
experiences are preferentially incorporated into dreams (Malinowski & Horton, under 
review; Schredl, 2006). The inference is that whole, intact EMs are not useful 
information; therefore they are not replayed in dreams this way. Alternatively, it may 
be that intact EMs are mostly not re-activated during sleep because of the potential 
confusion they could create with waking reality, as in the only dream that was scored 
4 out of 4 on the Episodic Richness scale.  These notions accord with the present 
study’s findings that the majority of dreams were rated with one point on Episodic 
Richness in Dreams scale (the least amount of episodic richness possible on the 
scale without being zero); the original memories may have been incorporated 
fragmentarily, according to usefulness.  
The ~80% of dreams in the present study that contained low to moderate levels of 
episodic richness also contained much additional created detail, forming dreams 
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incongruent with waking reality. Such ‘dream bizarreness’ may reflect the sleeping 
brain’s tendency to dream of one’s waking life, and especially one’s emotional 
concerns, metaphorically (e.g. Hartmann, 1996). As the sleeping brain progresses 
from sleep onset to NREM to REM sleep, the amount of hallucinatory (as well as 
emotional) activity increases, and the amount of logical, directed thought decreases 
(Baylor & Cavallero, 2001). There may be some purpose behind this exchange: 
perhaps as (episodic) memory consolidation slows down from sleep onset to REM 
sleep, and some other function, relating to the processing of emotions, speeds up 
(Stickgold et al., 2001).  
 
A methodological challenge of the present study is that, as in Fosse et al. (2003), it 
relies on experimenter ratings, and it has been shown that external raters 
underestimate various aspects of dreams (e.g. Schredl & Doll, 1998). To verify the 
present findings, future studies could use participant-given ratings for the memory 
sources of dreams. Further, identifying the prevalence of different ‘bound’ 
autobiographical features (such as characters with locations, for instance) might 
provide insight into the degrees of association between AM elements, throughout the 
consolidation process. Sampling both dreams and AMs as systematically as 
possible, using lab-based systematic awakening paradigms, would reduce the error 
associated with lengthy intervals between experience and recall.  
 
AM has scarcely been touched upon in dream research. Much more research is 
needed to gauge how AM appears in dreams (Horton & Conway, 2009; Horton et al., 
2010). Additionally, as noted above, EMs may play out more in NREM dreams than 
REM dreams. Future studies exploring EM, conceptualised in accordance with 
current memory theory, should also investigate NREM dream reports, using a 
systematic-awakenings paradigm.   
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In conclusion, we have found that, utilising a definition of episodic memory that falls 
in line with current theoretical conceptualisations of it including featuring autonoetic 
consciousness, dreams very rarely feature  intact episodic memories. This is in line 
with Fosse et al.’s (2003) findings. However, dreams frequently contained memory 
sources with low to moderate levels of episodic richness, indicating that memories for 
personal experiences do appear in dreams, albeit fragmentarily. We suggest that 
these memories may be conceived of as autobiographical memories. Rather than 
replaying experiences intact, dreams constitute autobiographical memory 
constructions. 
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